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A bilateral trading model with investment is considered. In the
“cooperative” investment version of the model, the seller’s investment
stochastically determines the buyer’s valuation of the good. The value
and cost of the good are realized only after the investment is made, and
the investment level and the realization of the good’s value and cost
are private information. I show that under these assumptions, no con-
tract made prior to the investment can simultaneously induce eﬃcient
investment and eﬃcient ex-post trade when the buyer’s type is contin-
uously distributed. This ineﬃciency result contrasts sharply with the
eﬃciency result under the standard “selﬁsh” investment model, where
the seller’s investment stochastically determines the seller’s cost.
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11 Introduction
Consider the following interaction between a buyer and a seller. The buyer
is interested in obtaining one unit of a good that the seller can produce.
The seller makes an investment which stochastically determines the buyer’s
valuation of the good; in this sense the investment is “cooperative.” The
good is traded after its value and cost are realized.
The note asks, when the seller’s investment level is unobservable and the
good’s value and cost are private information, whether the ﬁrst best outcome
(deﬁned as simultaneous eﬃcient investment and eﬃcient trade) is possible.
This problem is not trivial. If the investment problem is absent, eﬃcient
trade is achievable, because, unlike Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983), there
is no interim individual rationality.1 Also, if the good’s value and cost are
not private information, eﬃcient investment is attainable.
This note shows that, under a “cooperative” investment environment, no
eﬃciency-inducing contract exists when the buyer’s valuation is distributed
continuously. Schmitz (2002a) oﬀers a model in which the buyer’s valuation
of the good is either “high” or “low.” He shows that the ﬁrst-best outcome
is possible when the good’s cost lies between high and low valuations. The
current note ﬁnds that this is the only case in which the ﬁrst-best is possible
when investment is “cooperative.”
This ineﬃciency result contrasts sharply with the eﬃciency result un-
der the standard “selﬁsh” investment model, where the seller’s investment
stochastically determines the seller’s cost. Konakayama et al. (1986) and
Rogerson (1992) proved the existence of an eﬃcient mechanism in the stan-
dard model; moreover, Schmitz (2002b) showed that the ﬁrst-best outcome
is achievable through a simple contract and renegotiation.
Several papers have analyzed this problem in a complete information
framework. Che and Hausch (1999) showed that in a cooperative investment
model, the eﬃcient outcome may not be attainable if parties cannot commit
not to renegotiate. In contrast, in a selﬁsh investment model under the
same assumptions, the ﬁrst-best outcome may be achievable (N¨ oldeke and
Schmidt 1995, Edlin and Reichelstein 1996). However, very few analysis
have employed an incomplete information framework. This note provides
insights into the cooperative investment model when the investment level
and the realization of the good’s value and cost are private information.
2 Model
Consider a buyer (B) and a seller (S), both of whom are risk-neutral. In
the initial period, t = 0, they agree to a contract specifying the allocation
1Myerson-Satterthwaite Theorem shows that it is impossible to achieve ex-post eﬃ-
ciency when the good’s value and cost are private information and trade is voluntary.
2of one unit of an indivisible good and the associated monetary transfer.
At time t = 1, the seller chooses the investment level. The investment
level stochastically determines the realization of the buyer’s valuation of the
good at time t = 2 as follows. Suppose the seller chooses an investment
level, e ∈ E ⊂ <. The cost of investment is represented by ψ(e), where
ψe > 0 and ψee > 0. Then the buyer’s valuation, v ∈ V = [v, ¯ v] ⊂ <,
is realized according to the distribution function F(v|e). The distribution
function is ﬁrst-order stochastic dominant, with Fe(v|e) ≤ 0 and Fe(v|e) < 0
for some v. The seller’s production cost, c ∈ C ⊂ <,2 is also realized at time
t = 2, according to distribution function G(c). Note that this cost does not
depend on the investment level, and thus the investment is “cooperative.”
It is assumed that supV > inf C.3
Let q(˜ v,˜ c) and t(˜ v,˜ c) be the allocation and transfer rules, respectively,
for time t = 3 as speciﬁed by the contract agreed upon in the initial period.
q(˜ v,˜ c) ∈ [0,1] and q(˜ v,˜ c) = 1 when the buyer obtains the good and q(˜ v,˜ c) =
0 when the seller keeps the good. A version of the Revelation Principle
shows that it is without loss of generality to restrict our attention to direct
mechanisms. The allocation and transfer rules are contingent on the reports
from the buyer, ˜ v ∈ V , and the seller, ˜ c ∈ C. The contract can be contingent
on the seller’s report on investment level, but it is useless because investment
does not satisfy single crossing property. Then the utility of the buyer and
the seller after time t = 2 are given by4
uB(˜ v,˜ c|v) = vq(˜ v,˜ c) − t(˜ v,˜ c)
uS(˜ v,˜ c|c) = t(˜ v,˜ c) − cq(˜ v,˜ c) − ψ(e).
The eﬃcient allocation is then
q∗(v,c) =
(
1 when v ≥ c,
0 when v < c.
Intuitively, this condition states that the buyer obtains the good only if her
valuation is more that the seller’s cost. Note that this condition does not
depend on the investment level. Because supV > inf C, there exists some
valuation-cost pair (v,c) for which q∗(v,c) = 1.
3 The Ineﬃciency Result
This section investigates an incentive for investment given an incentive com-
patible allocation rule.
2C does not need to be an interval. Also, c does not need to be stochastic.
3If supV ≤ inf C, choosing the lowest investment level is optimal, the ﬁrst best is
attainable.
4This paper considers only transfer rules which satisfy a balanced-budget constraint.
3Consider an allocation rule, q = q(v,c), which is strictly positive for
some (v,c). To achieve this allocation ex-post, the allocation and transfer




{vq(v,c) − t(v,c)}g(c)dc ≥
Z
C
{vq(v0,c) − t(v0,c)}g(c)dc, (1)
Z
V




∀{(v,c),(v0,c0)} ∈ {V × C}2.
Given some allocation rule, q, let e†(q) be the eﬃcient investment level.
Assumption 1. e†(q) > inf E.
This assumption precludes irrelevant cases.
Assumption 2. The eﬃcient investment level is an inner solution: e†(q)





(v − c)q(v,c)fe(v|e†)g(c)dvdc = ψe(e†). (2)
This assumption is met when Fee ≥ 0 and C = {c}, for example.
Proposition 1. Given an allocation rule q, any transfer rule t can induce
an investment level less than the eﬃcient investment level, e < e†(q), only.
Proof. The proof proceeds by contradiction. Suppose the contract which
implements the investment level e ≥ e†(q) exists, then the contract should





(v − c)q(v,c)fe(v|e)g(c)dvdc ≤ ψe(e). (3)





From incentive compatibility condition (1), applying the envelop theorem,
this interim utility is





























vq(v,c)g(c)f(v|e) − q(v,c)g(c){1 − F(v|e)}dcdv − uB(v). (4)






{t(v,c) − cq(v,c)}f(v|e)g(c)dvdc − ψ(e),













(v − c)q(v,c)g(c)fe(v|e) + q(v,c)g(c)Fe(v|e)dcdv = ψe(e). (5)
The second part of the left hand side is strictly negative. Suppose not,
Fe(v) = 0 for almost all {v|
R
C q(v,c)g(c)dc > 0}, then fe(v|e) = 0 for
almost all {v|
R
C q(v,c)g(c)dc > 0}, and the lowest investment is eﬃcient,





(v − c)q(v,c)g(c)fe(v|e)dcdv > ψe(e),
a contradiction to (3).
Comments are in order. First, uncertainty about c is not essential for
the ineﬃciency result. Second, there is no assumption on ex-post bargaining
stage, the result holds for all incentive compatible allocation and transfer
rules.
Why the seller under invests? When v is high, the seller has to pay
information rent for the buyer. First-order stochastic dominance means
that, when the seller invests, probability of realization of high v is large.
Because the seller wants to increase the transfer (reduce the payment of
information rent), he chooses low investment level.
Next Corollary is immediate from Proposition 1.
Corollary 1. The eﬃcient allocation q∗ and the eﬃcient investment level
e†(q∗) cannot be achieved simultaneously.
54 The Second Best Contract
This section characterizes the second best contract. For simplicity, it is
assumed that C = {c}, there is no uncertainty about the seller’s cost.





(v − c)q(v)f(v|e)dv − ψ(e),
subject to
vq(v) − t(v) ≥ vq(v0) − t(v0) ∀(v,v0) ∈ V 2,
Z
V
{t(v) − cq(v)}fe(v|e) = ψe(e),
1 ≥ q(v) ≥ 0.
The ﬁrst two constraints are equivalent to monotonicity condition, q(v) ≥
q(v0) when v > v0, and
Z
V
(v − c)q(v)fe(v|e) + q(v)Fe(v|e)dv = ψe(e), (6)
as it is shown in the previous section.
Let λ be the Lagrange multiplier for (6), then the Hamiltonian is
H ≡ (v − c)q(v) + λ






where λ ≥ 0.
Proposition 2. In the second best contract, vS ≥ c.
Proof. When v < c,
(v − c) + λ






is always negative, then q(v) = 0 is the optimal.
vS < c cannot be the second best, not only because it is ex-post ineﬃcient
but also reduces the seller’s investment by increasing the buyer’s information
rent. This result is similar to the second best contract of Myerson and
Satterthwaite (1983). Although their ineﬃciency result arises partly because
of interim individual rationality, while the current one partly because of
cooperative investment, ineﬃciency is moderate when information rent is
modest, which is the result of common problem, incentive compatibility.
6Now, solve the optimal vS. Since the Hamiltonian is linear in q, the
optimal trade decision is characterized by a “bang-bang” solution:5
q(v) =
(
1 if v ≥ vS,
0 if v < vS.
Given this, (6) is
Z ¯ v
vS
(v − c)q(v)fe(v|e) + q(v)Fe(v|e)dv = ψe(e),
and, integrating by part, this is
[(v − c)Fe(v|e)]
¯ v
vS = −(vS − c)Fe(vS|e) = ψe(e). (7)
From (7), the investment level can write as a function of vS, e = e(vS).





(v − c)q(v)f(v|e(vS))dv − ψ(e(vS)).
Proposition 3. vS is ¯ v > vS ≥ c and a root of
−(vS − c)f(vS) +
Z ¯ v
vS







Fe(vS|e(vS)) + (vS − c)fe(vS|e(vS))
(vS − c)Fee(vS|e(vS)) + ψee(e(vS))
.
Proof. The derivative of the objective function is
−(vS − c)f(vS) +
Z ¯ v
vS




The derivative is −(¯ v − c)f(¯ v) < 0, when vS = ¯ v, and
Z ¯ v
c





when vS = c. The bracketed term is positive because Proposition 1 says
that the second best investment level is sub optimal. Thus the problem has
an solution, ¯ v > vS ≥ c, which satisﬁes the ﬁrst order condition.
5See Riley and Zeckhauser (1983).
75 Conclusion
It has been shown that it is impossible to achieve the ﬁrst-best outcome
when the buyer’s type is continuously distributed. Intuitively, when trade
takes place by even or more than two types, same result may apply. This
result can be extended to the case where both the buyer and seller make
cooperative investments. The ﬁrst-best outcome is generally impossible in
this framework.
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